The use of contractors in the battlefield is not new. They have been employed throughout history to fulfill combat and combat support functions. However, the magnitude of reliance on contractors has grown leading to a rapid rise of an uncontrolled industry. Reduction in force and defense budgets, out-sourcing, complex technology, and operational tempo has forced the United Stated Government to rely heavily on non-uniformed support to carry out mission objectives in a theater of operations. Contracting has had several problems to include insufficient oversight, transparency and accountability, and ambiguous legal status potentially leading to contract waste, fraud and abuse. To reduce waste, fraud and abuse there are several tools that the federal government can use. This paper will focus on those tools that are not being effectively utilized and provide recommendations for improving contractor performance and accountability, contracting and management systems and practices, as well as, the skills of the acquisition workforce.
PROGRAM OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Civilian contractors have accompanied and supported troops in the field throughout much of history and are no longer restricted to acquisition and logistics functions. They are found nearly everywhere, and their presence on the battlefield is a reality. 1 Contractors provide a wide range of services, which include supply and field operations, engineering and construction, communication networks, transportation and cargo, facilities maintenance, logistics support for some new weapon systems, operating information and intelligence systems, equipment repair and maintenance, linguistics, and personal security. They provide support to weapons systems such as the Apache helicopter and chemical and biological detection equipment. 2 They serve as the most trusted advisers to the three and four-star generals leading the nation"s wars.
They spy on foreign governments, eavesdrop on terrorist networks, craft war plans, and gather information on local factions in war zones, according to the Washington Post. 3 The U.S. Army has never fought an extended conflict that required this many functions to be outsourced. What makes this significant is the level of support, location, and criticality of the support contractors now provide. Several factors contribute to the increased use of contractors. They are as follows: the downsizing of the military after the Cold War, a growing reliance on contractors to support high-tech weaponry and provide initial or lifetime support for complex weapon systems. Efforts to improve efficiency and accrue funds for sustainment and modernization programs, public opinion was a significant concern of political and military leaders in the war in Iraq and leaders believed that the use of contractors would diminish American troop casualties, 4 and personnel reductions and budget cuts have also been driving factors in the move to outsource or privatize many functions or activities. 5 Never before has the distinction between civilian and Soldier been as blurred or tactical operations relied as heavily on nonmilitary personnel. Privatization allows soldiers to focus on combat mission roles rather than combat service support roles, and provides a surge capacity to field additional support forces rapidly as a force-multiplier without the residual cost of employing a large military force. The extensive use of contractors on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan has engendered strong emotion and calls for change. 8 Policymakers continue to express concern over the management and oversight of contracts in these regions for several reasons, including; the expense and difficulty of managing logistical support contracts; transparency and accountability; 9 alleged favoritism in issuing them; 10 allegations and reported instances of contract waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement; and questions regarding Department of Defense (DoD"s) ability and capacity to manage such contracts. 11 With hundreds of billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars invested in the two theaters since 9/11, and probably more to come, it is critical that we continue to strengthen our oversight of the contracting in these areas.
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DoD"s primary challenges have been to provide effective management and oversight, including failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of contract oversight personnel, and a lack of comprehensive training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel. These challenges have led to lack of oversight, discipline and accountability in contract management, and negative operational and monetary impacts potentially leading to contract waste, fraud and abuse. 13 To reduce waste, fraud and abuse there are several tools that the federal government can use. This paper will focus on those tools that are not being effectively utilized and provide recommendations for improving contractor performance and accountability, contracting and management systems and practices, as well as, the skills of the acquisition workforce.
DoD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan. These steps include tracking contracting data, coordinating the movements of contractors throughout the battle space, issuing new policy on managing contractors, implementing contracting training for uniformed personnel, increasing the size of the acquisition workforce to manage contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan and updating DoD doctrine to incorporate the role of contractors. However, some of these efforts are still in progress and could take many years to effectively implement. 20 In implementing SPOT, the three agencies" specified criteria for determining which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT varied and were not consistent with the criteria in the MOU. For example, DoD, State, and USAID officials stated that the primary factor in deciding to enter contractor personnel into SPOT was whether they needed a SPOT-generated letter of authorization (LOA) required to receive military identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons.
Using this criterion, individual"s needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if their contracts did not meet the MOU"s 14-day of performance or $100,000 thresholds.
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Thus local nationals were not being entered into SPOT as they did not need LOAs.
However, because of varying criteria on which contractor should be entered into the system, the information in SPOT does not present an accurate picture of the total number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. 22 Further, the GAO report states that the three agencies could not verify the accuracy or completeness of the contractor personnel data they provided, and officials acknowledged that they are likely undercounting the actual number of contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Officials from the three agencies stated they lack the resources to verify the information being reported by their contractors, their primary source of data.
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When contractor employees are involved in supporting an operation, they must be accounted for in a similar manner as military and civilian personnel. In order to accurately account for contractors, agencies must hold government and contractor personnel accountable for proper reporting, eliminate conflicting guidance, and ensure that criteria for entering contracts and contractor personnel into SPOT is consistent with the MOU and NDAA. Agencies must also lower the threshold to track contractor personnel and expand SPOT capability to generate reports on contractors wounded and killed. Until SPOT is effectively implemented, agencies and Congress will not receive reliable information on contracts and contractor personnel to improve oversight and decision making. Further, the government not contractors should be required to enter data into SPOT and Congress must designate a lead manager for SPOT.
Lack of Effective Financial Management
Questions have been raised about federal spending on contractors. The
Chairmen of the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) estimates that the United
States has wasted tens of billions of the nearly $200 billion that has been spent on contracts and grants since 2002 to support military, reconstruction, and other U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 24 The principal motivation behind creation of the CWC was that the State Department could not provide a line-by-line accounting of the money it had spent on reconstruction in Iraq. 25 The commission has also highlighted overspending on contracts as a key concern. 26 The Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982 establishes the overall requirements with regard to internal controls. Accordingly, an agency head must establish controls that reasonably ensure that (1) obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable law; (2) all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation; and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to agency operations are properly recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable financial and statistical reports and to maintain accountability over the assets. 27 For example, JIEDDO"s financial management processes do not provide adequate assurances that its financial information is accurate. As a result, the GAO reports that JIEDDO is unable to provide full transparency over the cost of its operations. 28 In reviewing funding transactions totaling $795 million, 18 of 24 initiatives
were not properly authorized in accordance with internal control standards. As a result, funds may be used without proper scrutiny and without a mechanism to detect, correct, costs were $13.4 million, 34 and mobilization costs were $5.8 million. 35 In August 2004, the contracting officer wrote to KBR expressing concern that the company was "accruing exorbitant costs at a rapid pace," according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) report. 36 The SIGIR attributed the lag time to poor planning on the government's part. 37 In addition, audits conducted by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) found that contractors" had inadequate accounting and billing systems.
A company"s costs can also be higher by hiring layers of subcontractors to do their work for them through overhead fees being passed from one contractor to another.
For example, under Blackwater Security Firm"s contract for private security services in Iraq, the contract paid workers guarding food trucks a salary of $600 a day. The company added overhead costs and a 36% markup to its bill, and forwarded the bill to a Kuwaiti company. The Kuwaiti company added their costs and profit, and sent the bill to the food company. The food company did the same, and finally sent the bill to KBR.
KBR passed its cost on to DoD. In a congressional committee hearing the U.S. Army stated that it had never authorized KBR to enter into a subcontracting relationship with
Blackwater.
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The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) provided less than adequate control for approximately $8. that JIEDDO inconsistently applied JCAAMP allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process"s key milestone decision reviews and approval steps. As a result, JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over C-IED initiatives thus limiting visibility over CIEDs efforts across DoD. 43 This lack of visibility could lead to duplication of efforts. The requires. In addition, the failure to enforce the clause from the inception of the contract in December 2001 (nearly 3 years) represents a significant internal control weakness that put the Government at significant risk for overpayment. 48 The Commanding and despite the increased complexity of contracting. In fact, the workforce has been declining. 53 The CWC reported that managerial shortages and limited oversight of contractors led to potentially unnecessary construction, such as a new $30 million dining facility to be completed a year before U.S. troops were required to leave Iraq, even though a then-recently upgraded dining facility was located nearby. 54 The single greatest shortfall in contracting practices in Iraq and Afghanistan was that Washington lacked the capacity to oversee the unexpected massive volume of contracts. An adequate workforce helps to prevent waste, fraud and abuse by providing oversight and accountability and defining requirements. There cannot be well managed contracts without people to manage them. The Gansler Commission report concluded that Army expeditionary contracting had the following deficiencies: increased workload, increased complexity, increased tempo, declining capability and questionable Army Acquisition Management. 55 FAR part 37 states that "agencies shall ensure that sufficiently trained and experienced professional are available to manage contracts." The burden rests with the federal government to ensure that enough appropriately trained professionals are available to manage contracts. 56 As the SIGIR noted, "the shortage of personnel (and the widespread lack of required skill and experience among those available) affected all facets of reconstruction assistance." 57 DoD lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. One rationale often cited for the outsourcing of program management to industry is that DoD no longer has the in-house expertise needed to manage such complicated acquisition programs. 58 Over the past few years the size, shape, and complexity of logistical support service contracts have grown with the technical requirements. However, the size of the federal contractor workforce has decreased.
There is now an imbalance. There are fewer federal contracting officials to manage the large-scale contracts and in some cases the government has sought to hire contractors to do the job that federal employees use to perform. Secretary Gates has announced a move to significantly increase the size of the defense acquisition workforce, primarily achieved by converting about 10,000 private-sector contractor positions to full-time government positions, and hiring an additional 10,000 defense acquisition workforce employees by 2015. 59 According to DoD officials, the long-term goal is to increase the size of the organic defense acquisition workforce to its 1998 levels of approximately 147,000 employees. 60 At the same time, statements issued by President Obama have signaled his intention to reduce contractors by 10% and defense contracting spending by reviewing DoD"s acquisition processes prior to the commencement of the next Quadrennial Defense Review, and to require each federal agency to justify the use of cost-reimbursement (also known as costs-plus) and sole-source (also known as noncompetitive) contracts with possible implications for DoD acquisition policy. 61 DoD"s ability to assure that taxpayer dollars are being used judiciously is limited because it does not have sufficient numbers of contractor oversight personnel. For example, in recent testimony before Congress, a GAO official reported that if adequate staffing had been in place, the Army could have realized substantial savings on LOGCAP contracts in Iraq. The GAO official also stated that one Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) official, who is responsible for overseeing the LOGCAP contractor"s performance at 27 locations, reported that he was "unable to visit all of those locations during his six-month tour to determine the extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract"s requirements." 62 In reducing the size and shape of the federal acquisition workforce, an unanticipated result has been the increase in the growth of the private sector service contracts and with not enough contracting officials.
The past downsizing of the defense acquisition workforce has resulted in the loss of technical personnel and a talent drain on DoD"s ability to meet its mission and objectives. 63 Congress is concerned about the federal oversight and management of DoD contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly under programs that involve large sums of money such as LOGCAP. According to the congressional testimony of Charles Williams, director of the DCMA, there are more than 600 oversight positions still vacant in Iraq and Afghanistan. 64 Recent assessments from GAO, DoD IG, and the SIGIR reveal a lack of federal oversight, management, and accountability for funds spent for Iraq contracting. 65 The Gansler report determined that the Army contracting process is undermanned, overworked, inexperienced, and undervalued by the operational Army. The auditors observed that the cost of DBA insurance substantially exceeded the losses experienced by the LOGCAP contractor. The data the Committee received from AIG indicate that expenses in providing DBA insurance are typically 40% of premiums. Using this estimate, AIG"s expenses under the LOGCAP contract would be $114 million, and its underwriting profit would be $97 million. The AAA concluded that AIG"s rates appear "unreasonably high" and "excessive," warning of an "increased risk that the Army could be overcharged." Army auditors also raised concerns about the cost-plus nature of these charges because the LOGCAP contract is primarily a cost-reimbursable contract the cost of this insurance is ultimately passed on to the government. As a result, there is little incentive for KBR to control its costs for DBA insurance……..although the Army auditors found that "Army personnel at all levels appear to be aware of, and concerned with, the high cost of DBA insurance," they concluded that "sufficient action hadn"t been taken to scrutinize these costs." The auditors also warned that "we believe similar problems could exist on other contracts outside the LOGCAP arena." 77 In addition, the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting Task Force's efforts followed investigations and audits which have cited contractors and government contracting officials for corrupt activity related to contingency contracting. While the cases vary in severity and complexity, most involve bribery. There are confirmed bribes in excess of $15 million. Contracts valued at more than $6 billion are affected. The
Army has reorganized its contracting office in Kuwait, replaced its leaders, and increased the size of the staff and provided more ethics training. 78 Contracting professionals do not bear the sole responsibility for contracting.
Responsibility for managing, overseeing, and evaluating contractors falls not only to contract specialists, but also to those who define mission requirements, allocate resources, plan tasks and operations, promulgate policies and programs, and use contractor services 79 to include senior military and civilian officials. Care must be taken to avoid improper influence and decision making left in the hands of responsible officials who have the skills, knowledge, attributes, and capabilities to do the right thing.
Conclusion and Recommendation
Contractor support has been a part of military operations in the past, and it will be part of operations in the future. Getting contracting right is a fundamental responsibility of good governance and essential for fiscal responsibility particularly when supporting national security activities. To turn government contracting from a liability into a competitive advantage requires a transformation in businesses practices. 80 Government officials must define clear requirements to include documentation and avoid improper command influence on the contracting process, effectively implement a comprehensive database, and review and update policies and instructions to ensure best value for the federal government and track financial performance. They must hold contractor"s accountable and ban companies from doing business with federal agencies who have exploited the system, and avoid use of sole-source and limited competition, 81 that is, subject large defense contracts to competition and that a minimum of three contractors be selected for contracts beyond a certain size, or break large contracts into smaller contracts thus allowing small businesses to compete for contracts. In addition, they must build human capital and contracting officer support system as the key to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of contracting by increasing more military and civilian acquisition personnel, and identify training needs for non-acquisition personnel and develop programs to improve training of government personnel to manage contractors by introducing courses on contract support and contract operations into mission readiness exercises. 82 
